Türkiye Must Have a Foreign Policy Review
Ankara’s foreign policy of the past fifteen years is a story of extreme rhetoric, defiance, and inconsistencies. Every country can make reasonable adjustments to its foreign policy. But if U-turns become a pattern, this signals a lack of long-term foresight. A sound foreign policy follows a steady course like a big ship, it does not constantly change direction like a runabout.
In December 2009, the communique issued at the end of the Damascus meeting of the “Turkish-Syrian High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council” referred to a “strategic partnership”, then a fashionable label for Türkiye’s close external relationships. It mentioned common threats and challenges confronting the two countries.
A year later, in remarks to the press with his Syrian counterpart in Latakia, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu underlined that the exemplary relations between Syria and Türkiye were a model for regional partnerships.
And, two years later, it dawned upon Türkiye’s AKP government that Assad was a dictator. Thus, aspiring to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Damascus the government grabbed the leading role in the regime change project in Syria. Ankara joined hands with the US, other Western countries, and Gulf states to oust President Assad from power. Forgotten were the common threats and total economic integration. Mr. Assad metamorphosed from a friend into “the enemy of his people”. He called this reversal of policy a betrayal. Today none of those countries are there except the US, and we are desperate to put our relations with Syria back on track.
Our relations with Egypt soured because of Ankara’s unreserved support for the Muslim Brotherhood. For years the Turkish-Egyptian relationship had remained on the right track. Cairo saw itself as the Arab world’s leader and sometimes perceived Ankara as a regional competitor, whereas Türkiye had no inhibitions to expanding cooperation. It was the right approach benefiting both sides.
During the heyday of the Arab Spring, Hosni Mubarak’s fall from power, and the election of Mohamed Morsi as president were rejoiced by Ankara. But the latter’s ouster changed everything. The AKP government was outraged. Relations with Cairo became confrontational. Today we are trying to put our relations with Egypt on track but this will take time.
What took Ankara’s relationship with the UAE was also AKP’s unreserved support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the UAE’s fight against it. On November 24, 2021, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi visited Ankara. In February 2022, President Erdogan visited the UAE for the first time in nearly a decade to revive relations. He said, “We are taking steps to bring our relations back to the level they deserve.”
This too will take time. Because, since the Hamas onslaught of October 7, Ankara has once again displayed its full support for the Muslim Brotherhood and has become Israel’s most vociferous critic in the world. By contrast, the four Arab countries that have signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, and Saudi Arabia have been critical of Israel but have not gone that far. They are getting ready for the day after. They are no friends of the Brotherhood. Moreover, U-turns do not immediately restore a relationship and above all mutual trust.
Russia and Türkiye were on diametrically opposite sides at the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Russia supported the regime, and the Turkish government the opposition. Nonetheless, Turkish-Russian relations appeared to remain on track.
On November 24, 2015, a stunning development changed the picture. Türkiye shot down a Russian Su-24 military plane for having violated Turkish airspace for 17 seconds. Had Turkish-Russian relations been characterized by antagonism, unresolved disputes, and continuing tensions, the path to this incident could have been explained more easily. However, the two countries were enjoying a stable and mutually rewarding relationship for decades.
In the wake of the incident, President Putin vented his anger. He directed far-reaching accusations against the Turkish government for having links to the Islamic State (IS). He imposed a series of economic sanctions against Ankara. In response, Türkiye’s leadership said that more than enough warnings had been issued for airspace violations. It rejected IS-related accusations as slander. Ankara sought assurances from NATO saying that the Turkish-Syrian border is also a NATO border.
Soon, however, bravado gave way to realities. Ankara had to recognize that confrontation with Russia was not sustainable. Thus, in June 2016 Türkiye apologized for the incident and an effort to restore the relationship was launched.
In 2017, Türkiye signed the S-400s deal with Russia in its first major weapons purchase from Moscow. Türkiye’s NATO allies were critical of the deal, but Ankara presented this as a sovereign decision. As allied criticism became more vocal it said this was a “done deal”.
When looked at in the broad context of Türkiye’s relationship with Russia, one cannot but conclude that the S-400s contract was the price Türkiye had to pay to put behind the downing of the Su-24, plus the murder of Russia’s Ambassador in Ankara, and thus restore its cooperation with Moscow because Türkiye’s multidimensional economic cooperation with Russia was not something Ankara could easily give up. Moreover, Ankara had no other option than to cooperate with Russia in Syria. Are Ankara’s relations with Moscow back where they were twenty years ago? Not exactly.
The implications of the S-400s deal and Türkiye’s steady democratic decline for Ankara’s relations with Washington and the EU need no elaboration. Yes, Western countries have never refrained from cultivating close relationships with authoritarian Middle East regimes. However, Türkiye has always claimed, including the last 22 years of AKP rule, that it was different, a country aspiring for democracy.
Türkiye and Israel enjoyed good relations for decades. The coming to power of the AKP in 2002 introduced an element of uncertainty into the relationship. However, there was no major disturbance until the “one-minute” incident at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 30, 2009, where Prime Minister Erdoğan, in the presence of President Shimon Peres, strongly denounced Israel for its attitude toward the Palestinians. This marked the beginning of the downturn.
The Davos clash was followed by the “Mavi Marmara” incident in May 2010. A Turkish NGO organized a flotilla to take humanitarian assistance to Gaza in defiance of the Israeli maritime blockade. Israel warned them it would not allow this, but the organizers were determined. The Turkish government chose to let the initiative run its course. Finally, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) boarded the flagship of the flotilla, Mavi Marmara, and killed nine Turks. Diplomatic representation in Ankara and Tel Aviv was brought to the lowest level. Later, reportedly, Mr. Netanyahu apologized to Mr. Erdogan over the telephone. Israel also paid compensation for the casualties.
In March 2022 President Herzog visited Ankara. In August the two countries restored diplomatic ties. Soon after, ambassadors arrived in Ankara and Tel Aviv.
After the October 7 Hamas assault on Israel, Ankara appeared to take a balanced approach to the fighting. That did not last. Ankara declared that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a group of mujahidin struggling to liberate their land.
A balanced approach to the war in Gaza would not have prevented Ankara from calling on Israel for restraint in its bombing of Gaza, and now Lebanon, from strongly criticizing Tel Aviv for its disregard for civilian lives and calling for cease-fires. This would have allowed Ankara to engage with other countries having similar concerns. It would have kept our lines of communication open and active with Israel, the US, Arab, and European countries. It would have made Türkiye a dialogue partner for all, particularly now as the region stands on the edge of a precipice.
Last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said, “Israel has come to Lebanon after reaching its goals in Gaza. Where will it lead after Lebanon and what targets will it pursue? We have some projections, but I’ll keep those to ourselves for now,” the minister added.[i]
Mr. Numan Kurtulmuş, the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly, chose not to save those projections for himself. He told a Turkish columnist that Zionism has reached the final stage of dominating the region extending from the Nile to the Euphrates and Türkiye is among the final targets of this policy.[ii]
Finally, in remarks before the Grand National Assembly, last Tuesday, President Erdoğan said: “Israel which acts in the delirium of promised lands will set its eyes with absolute religious fanaticism on our motherland after Palestine and Lebanon.”
Judging by these high-level statements, the “Israeli threat” is now an officially recognized security challenge for Türkiye. However, there are still some unanswered questions.
Has the “Israeli threat” been taken up with the West and NATO? After all, following the downing of the Russian Su-24 military plane we had rushed to Brussels for Allied support. Are we getting ready for direct military conflict with Israel or a war through proxies? Has Israel always been an enemy of Türkiye since its foundation in 1948? Has AKP’s Middle East policy contributed to a change in Israel’s attitude toward Ankara? Has the cost of Türkiye’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood for Türkiye’s national interests ever been analyzed? Could the declaration of Israel as an enemy also be a domestic political investment? If so, has the external cost been calculated? Could this be another attempt to distract attention from Türkiye’s economic freefall? Could such statements be the price of a quick restoration of relations with Damascus? Could all this be just a passing public discourse that the AKP government believes would easily be forgotten? Why have four Arab countries signed the Abraham Accords with Israel and we are moving in exactly the opposite direction? Are they after enhanced Middle East security, technology, trade, and know-how? Do they see Iran as a greater security threat than Israel? If so, why?
AlI I can say is, “It has been a sad journey for Türkiye, from being a country whose friendship was sought by all as a regional friend to the so-called “precious loneliness.”