President Trump’s Fifty-Day “Ultimatum”
After six months in office in his second term, the world has become accustomed to President Trump’s surprising changes of direction. Thus, his recent turnabout on the war in Ukraine and his relationship with President Putin, following their call on July 3, has not come as a stunner.
Since the February 28 confrontation between President Trump and President Zelensky, the issue of “suspension of arms deliveries to Ukraine” has remained on Washington’s agenda, with the most recent example being the pause on July 2 of some weapons shipments to Ukraine, including air defense missiles, due to concerns about the US stockpile. This was seen as a warning that a dangerous complacency about the war had taken hold on both sides of the Atlantic.[i]
Last Monday, during his meeting with Secretary General Rutte in the Oval Office, Mr. Trump stated that he had reached an agreement with NATO allies on arms deliveries to Ukraine, including Patriot missiles. The weapons would be fully paid for by Washington’s European allies, and the initial missile deliveries would come from European stocks, with the understanding that they would be replenished with U.S. supplies.[ii]
Furthermore, President Trump warned Russia that it will face severe sanctions, including 100% tariffs if no deal is reached on Ukraine within 50 days. He also threatened to impose 100% tariffs on Russian export buyers unless a peace deal with Ukraine is secured by early September. Currently, the scope of sanctions proposed by a bill in the US Senate includes a 500% tariff on all trade with those who purchase Russian hydrocarbons.
Mr. Rutte, who has been working with European countries to coordinate the purchase of U.S. weapons, said that Germany, Finland, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and Denmark would be among the buyers supplying Ukraine. The German government has already offered to finance two additional Patriot systems. Norway has offered one. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexis Grynkewich, confirmed that preparations for the delivery of the systems are now underway.
Reportedly, President Trump might provide Ukraine not only with Patriot systems but also with Tomahawk missiles. The most significant advantage of Tomahawks over all the weaponry currently available to the Ukrainian Armed Forces is their long range, between 1,600 to 2,500 kilometers.
Thus, looking at the broad picture, at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Allies committed to investing 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on core defense requirements and defense- and security-related spending by 2035. The confrontation between President Trump and President Zelensky is put behind, and arms shipments to Ukraine are being resumed. And Mr. Trump’s deadline of fifty days for peace allows Russia to carry its summer offensive to a conclusion.
Looking at the two ongoing wars, Western allies rightly want an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and an end to the loss of Ukrainian lives. And they remain “concerned” over the endless loss of life in Gaza and would not mind a ceasefire.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow last Tuesday that Russia needs time to analyze what was said in Washington. Former Russian President Medvedev called it a “theatrical ultimatum”.
President Putin’s endgame in Ukraine is Kyiv’s “capitulation”. What is not known exactly is what that means. For Mr. Putin, Ukraine’s capitulation would certainly include the recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas region and guarantees that Ukraine will never join NATO. Reportedly, such conditions were also included in Mr. Trump’s plans for peace. However, it appears that Mr. Putin would likely request more to claim victory. In other words, he wants more than Mr. Trump has been prepared to offer. After all, the initial aim of the invasion must have been more territorial gain, perhaps turning Ukraine into a landlocked country.
What may be his expanded demands for lasting peace?
In mid-December 2021, two months before the invasion, Russia presented the West with two draft documents, “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” and “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” The first was a more detailed text.[iii]
When Mr. Lavrov was asked at the time why the issues of Ukraine’s “non-admission” to NATO and NATO’s activity in Eastern Europe, which have been on the agenda for many years, became so paramount then, he said: “It’s been an accumulation. I am referring to the period after the 1990s when our Western friends carelessly threw out all their promises not to expand NATO, not to move military infrastructure eastward, not to deploy substantial military forces on the territory of the new members. During the five waves of expansion, NATO has come right to our borders.”
The talks on these two documents led nowhere, and on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.
At the time, in the light of remarks to the media by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and American Deputy Secretary Wendy R. Sherman, I had summarized the NATO/US response to Russia’s proposal of a NATO-Russia agreement as follows:
(a) Certain core Russian proposals are simply non-starters. These include the demand not to admit any new members to NATO and to withdraw forces from eastern allies.
(b) The NATO Allies are in complete unity that all countries must be able to choose their foreign policy orientation, that sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacrosanct and must be respected, and that all nations are and must be free to choose their alliances. The Alliance will not go back to 1997.
(c) However, the two sides can work on the limits on the size and scope of military exercises, transparency, deconfliction, communications, arms control, and a whole variety of other areas. The US is open to discussing the future of certain missile systems in Europe along the lines of the now-defunct INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia.
(d) If Russia were to invade Ukraine further, there would be significant costs and consequences well beyond what they faced in 2014. From the US perspective, it is very hard to see gas flowing through Nord Stream 2 if Russia renews its aggression on Ukraine.”
Since Russia constantly defines its fundamental condition for peace as the “elimination of the well-known root causes that led to the current state of affairs”, could President Putin be after some arrangements under paragraphs (c) and (d)? Perhaps. Unfortunately, however, Western perception of Russia’s foreign and security policy has changed dramatically, and deals that might have looked reasonable at the time may no longer be easily acceptable to the West. Nonetheless, President Putin may try.
At times since the invasion, NATO members have often upped the ante against Russia. For example, on February 26, 2024, President Macron, after hosting a meeting of 25 European leaders in Paris, said that there was “no consensus” on committing ground troops to the conflict in Ukraine but added, “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” In early March, during a visit to the Czech Republic, he urged Ukraine’s allies not to be “cowards” in supporting its fight against the Russian invasion. Germany, the UK, Spain, Poland, and the Czech Republic immediately ruled out any suggestion that they might commit ground troops to Ukraine. So did Washington.
The undeniable reality is that at present, there is war fatigue on all sides. And European countries would be just as happy as Mr. Trump if peace, even a lasting ceasefire, were to be achieved. Where the increasing cooperation between Germany, France, and the UK, the leaders of the “coalition of the willing”, would lead, and how it would be balanced with US interests, and harmonized with NATO, remains to be seen.
Also of interest would be how Chancellor Merz’s Russia policy would evolve, balancing his two top priorities, strengthening European defense and taking Germany out of recession. Following the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990, Germany enjoyed a stable relationship characterized by growing economic cooperation and interdependence with Moscow. Germany was a major importer of Russian natural gas. The $11 billion Nord Stream 2 project was completed in 202 but did not become operational due to rising tensions over Ukraine. On September 26, 2022, both the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea were sabotaged, rendering them inoperable.
Would Germany entirely give up the hope of future cooperation with Russia, or balance its investment in defense with the expectation of an improved security environment in eastern Europe after President Putin’s long reign comes to an end?
The delivery of Patriot systems to Ukraine seems to be a timely agreement among allies. However, the ongoing cost of their supply could eventually pose a problem for Europe, once again raising the question of using Russia’s frozen assets in the West to support Ukraine. This is a complex issue, and the International Crisis Group’s Q&A titled “A Frozen Conflict: The Dilemmas of Seizing Russia’s Money for Ukraine” provides a thorough analysis of the stakes involved.[iv]
President Trump’s threat to impose 100% tariffs on Russian export buyers unless a Ukraine peace deal is reached by September raises questions since such sanctions would hit two major powers, China and India. The scale of China’s mutual trade with Russia — nearly $250 billion per year, including huge oil imports — means that delivering on the threat would throw Mr. Trump into a showdown with Beijing. Some analysts say it is unlikely that Mr. Trump would risk a renewed confrontation with the world’s second-largest economy over Ukraine, a country whose fate he has long said is not vital to the United States.[v] India-Russia trade has reached USD 68.7 billion in the Financial Year 2024-25, and the target is USD 100 billion. Russia’s exports to India are dominated by oil and petroleum products. In brief, such tariffs would push Beijing closer to Russia and upset India.
In brief, “peace in fifty days” does not seem to be a realistic expectation. The war is likely to continue. Occasional ceasefires allowing for talks would be an achievement.
As for Türkiye, these are times of stress. The economy is in recession. Having “successfully contributed” to the ouster of President Assad, with whom they were great friends in the past at the highest levels, the AKP government is now faced with huge challenges. Moreover, in negotiations with the PKK/DEM Party, called “the process”, the government is preparing the path for constitutional changes to remain in power indefinitely. The public is in the dark as to the content of these negotiations.
What worries many in Türkiye are the increasing references by the AKP leadership and their partners to the “New Turkish Century”, because this appears to signal a final break with the first century of the Republic characterized by Atatürk reforms, secularism, enlightened education, modernity, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, a strong parliament and despite its roller-coaster pattern, Turkish democracy. Unfortunately, they still do not see that the only path to domestic peace and stability is our returning to democracy, and not deals that would put into doubt Türkiye’s identity and future.
It is worth remembering that it was the Turkish parliament, fully conscious of Türkiye’s long-term national interests, that rejected full cooperation with the US in its invasion of Iraq in 2003 under false premises. We still have a parliament, but one with a different orientation.
The US Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, a real estate investor, has become a controversial figure in just a few months due to his unfortunate comments regarding the Sèvres and Lausanne treaties, lack of knowledge of Turkish history, of our profound commitment to the founding documents of the Republic, and his attempts to impose a US-Israel-designed new Middle East order starting with Syria.
Perhaps he needs to learn that Article I of the Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921, signed between the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal reads:
”Both Contracting Parties agree not to recognize in principle and peace treaties of other international acts into which either of the Contracting Parties was made to enter by force. The Government of RSFSR hereby agrees not to recognize any international acts concerning Türkiye, which have not been accepted by the Government of Türkiye, currently represented by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.”
What was meant here was the Treaty of Sèvres. The RSFSR and Türkiye were not allies in 1921. Today, the US and Türkiye are NATO allies, at least on paper, and Ambassador Barrack needs to learn to respect Türkiye’s historic achievements.
[i] https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/07/ukraine-russia-drone-missile-strikes-europe-weapons-defense-plan?lang=en
[ii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/14/trump-does-deal-with-nato-allies-to-arm-ukraine-and-warns-russia-of-severe-sanctions
[iii] https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en&clear_cache=Y
[iv] https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/russia-internal-ukraine/frozen-conflict-dilemmas-seizing-russias-money-ukraine?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=email
[v] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/14/us/politics/trump-russia-ukraine-nato.html