The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Program
The Twelve-Day War and Operation Midnight Hammer have cast a shadow of uncertainty over the Middle East, raising questions about the pathway of Iran’s nuclear program. Of particular interest is how the US and Israel, the two principal opponents of a nuclear-armed Iran, would pursue their unvarying objective of not allowing Tehran to produce nuclear weapons.
How close Iran was to producing a nuclear weapon has long been a controversial topic, with some defining the time frame in weeks, others in years. In March, the US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, testifying before Congress, stated that the intelligence community “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003.” But she also said, “ Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons.”[i] After President Trump said she was “wrong”, the Director said that Iran could have a nuclear weapon “within months”.
On June 25, following the bombardment of Iran’s nuclear sites, President Trump said, “Monumental damage was done to all nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images. Obliteration is an accurate term!” Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated that the program was only delayed by a few months.
A week later, the Pentagon spokesperson said that the strikes degraded Iran’s nuclear program by one to two years. However, a leaked report from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that the attacks set Iran’s nuclear program back “only a few months”. Secretary of Defense Hegseth claimed that there was a “political motive” behind the leak.
Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology dates to the mid-20th century. Following the regime change in 1979, despite Tehran’s insistence that its program is peaceful, skepticism mounted. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) was a significant achievement in nuclear diplomacy, offering Iran sanctions relief in exchange for restrictions and inspections.
However, the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, followed by Iran’s alleged breach of its commitments, set in motion a cycle of escalation. And it was not only Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran’s expanding regional outreach, its use of proxies to challenge Israel, and its support for Hamas and Hezbollah were unacceptable developments for Prime Minister Netanyahu. The ouster of the Assad regime in Syria was a further setback for Iran, but that was not enough for the Israeli leader.
The Twelve-Day War was a huge blow to Iran. With its regional outreach already diminished, its military facilities were struck, and some of its top military commanders and nuclear scientists were killed in targeted bombings, underlining a huge intelligence deficiency for Tehran. The Israeli military estimates that some two-thirds of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers, around 250, were destroyed in strikes, along with around 1,000 of the missiles.
Iran’s ballistic missiles also reached some targets in Israel, but on balance, this was no match for the damage inflicted by Israel.
Yet, despite the US strikes, the fundamental question as to how close Iran still is to producing a nuclear weapon remains, largely because of its stock of enriched uranium, its centrifuge technology, and its know-how accumulated over the years despite the loss of some of its prominent nuclear scientists. In a recent interview with Le Monde, Foreign Minister Araghchi said, “A program that is under constant IAEA surveillance and operates within international law is not merely made up of buildings and machinery. The will of a people who have succeeded in reaching the highest levels of knowledge cannot be destroyed.”[ii]
There is uncertainty over what has happened to Iran’s highly enriched uranium since the US did not strike the Isfahan underground site with bunker-busters because it is too deep. According to CNN, US officials believe that Isfahan’s underground structures housed nearly 60% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, which Iran would need to produce a nuclear weapon.[iii]
Thus, some believe that only a small part of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium stockpile was destroyed, but the rest remained in the hands of the authorities. A senior Israeli official told Reuters last week that the stockpile — estimated at 400 kilograms enriched to 60 percent — “was not removed and has not been moved since,” suggesting Iran did not attempt to safeguard the material before or after the strikes. A Western intelligence official concurred that the US or Israel would know if the Iranians tried to retrieve the enriched uranium. Such a move, the official said, would surely invite a renewed Israeli bombing attack.[iv] Beyond the problem of the stockpile of enriched uranium is the question of Iran’s continuing to enrich uranium. The US and Israel strongly oppose any enrichment activity in the future. Yet, Foreign Minister Araghchi has said, “We will not have any agreement in which enrichment is not included.”
The IAEA announced on July 4 that its team of inspectors had left Iran, following the new law which barred cooperation with the UN body. Tehran had accused the IAEA of sharing sensitive data with Israel and the US, and of failing to condemn airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear sites.[v] This has led to some speculation that Iran might even decide to withdraw from the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), but Minister Araghchi has denied this.
Moreover, there is the question of how the Twelve-Day War and the US strikes would impact the thinking of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his closest advisors, whether it would encourage them to offer new assurances about the transparency of Iran’s nuclear program or to harden their determination to follow the example of North Korea. They may also opt for a middle path.
If the latter were to prove the case, Iran might continue to develop the capability for rapid weaponization without crossing the final threshold. In other words, it may wish to turn into a reality some earlier predictions that it can produce a nuclear weapon “in weeks”.
In making these choices, Mr. Khamenei would consider the often-mentioned “rivalry” between Iran’s hardliners and moderates, the perceived threats from the US and Israel, the impact of continuing sanctions on the economy, the requirements of post-war reconstruction, and the livelihood problems of Iranians. These would be tough choices for the Supreme Leader, but in today’s Iran, whatever he decides, the government of Prime Minister Pezeshkian would only have to agree.
Last week, President Trump said that the American and Iranian officials will be meeting soon, returning to diplomacy. When they meet, the American side would insist on the immediate return of the IAEA inspectors and their being provided with full access to facilities in every corner of Iran likely to have some connection with its nuclear program. They would demand clarification on Iran’s stock of enriched uranium. And they would insist on more than the “JCPoA Plus” that they tried to secure before the Twelve-Day War. They would not refrain from signaling further military operations against Iran if the talks were to lead nowhere within a given period. Beyond the nuclear issue, they would indicate a readiness to engage Iran in regional projects aimed at bringing peace and stability to the Middle East. They would offer a phased relief of economic sanctions in exchange for Tehran’s cooperation.
Israel would be the third invisible party at the Iran-US negotiation table. The Israeli security establishment has long maintained that it will not tolerate Iran achieving nuclear weapons capability. The Twelve-Day War has only hardened this view. Israel and the US have acted in lockstep in striking Iran. However, President Trump may now be more interested in a deal, while Mr. Netanyahu may be after Iran’s humiliation to ensure Israel’s regional superiority.
Iranian diplomacy is known for its tough negotiation tactics and its ability to extend talks. Formal negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal between Iran, the UK, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the US (the P5+1) began in November 2013 and continued for twenty months, until agreement was reached on the JCPoA on July 14, 2015. The deal was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015.
During those twenty months, the P5+1 worked with an outstanding Iranian diplomat, Javad Zarif. He served as Iran’s Foreign Minister from 2013 to 2021 in the government of Hassan Rouhani. With his country weakened, Foreign Minister Araghchi will have a much tougher job at the Iran-US talks. He would have the immense task of balancing the US/Israeli demands with the views of the Supreme Leader and his immediate entourage. The regime would be after a solution that it can present to the Iranian public as a reasonable and honorable way out of the conflict, if not outright victory.
In the same Le Monde interview, Mr. Araghchi said: “It must be guaranteed that in the future, during negotiations, the US does not launch a military attack.” However, the upcoming talks on Iran’s nuclear program are likely to be characterized by critical discussions on deadlines, time limits, and cutoff points.
It remains to be seen how the Iran-related developments, the endless loss of civilian lives in Gaza, and the Russia-Ukraine war will ultimately be framed within the various interpretations of the so-called rules-based international order.[vi]
[i] https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2025/4061-ata-hpsci-opening-statement-as-delivered
[ii] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/10/iranian-foreign-minister-abbas-araghchi-it-must-be-guaranteed-that-in-the-future-during-negotiations-the-us-does-not-launch-a-military-attack_6743246_4.html
[iii] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/27/politics/bunker-buster-bomb-isfahan-iran
[iv] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/us/politics/iran-attacks-damage.html?smid=em-share
[v] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507105041
[vi] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2021/05/10/the-rules-based-international-order/