Syria Facing Huge Challenges
A brief look at the past:
In 2009, the communique issued at the end of the Damascus meeting of the “Turkish-Syrian High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council” referred to a “strategic partnership”, then a fashionable label for Türkiye’s external relationships. It mentioned common threats and challenges confronting the two countries. A year later, Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, in remarks to the press with his Syrian counterpart in Latakia, underlined that the exemplary relationship between Syria and Türkiye was serving as a model for regional partnerships and that the two countries were aiming at total economic integration with neighbors.
Two years later, Türkiye’s “democratic” AKP government decided that President Assad was a dictator and Ankara joined hands with the US, other Western countries, and the Gulf states to oust him from power. But they were not united on who should succeed him. Aspiring to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Damascus, Ankara took a leading role in the regime change project. In the following years, the anti-Assad coalition disappeared. As Ankara strongly supported the Muslim Brotherhood, our relations with Egypt and the Gulf states became confrontational. Millions of Syrian refugees crossed the border into Türkiye. The YPG emerged as a major actor in Syria. Washington established a military presence in Syria and started to provide substantial military assistance to the YPG, considered by Ankara a terrorist group.
In brief, as I have often said, Türkiye’s foray into the Syrian conflict has been, beyond a shadow of a doubt, Ankara’s worst foreign policy blunder since the founding of the Republic in 1923. The political, security, and economic costs are obvious.
We could not possibly be an ardent supporter of the Assad regime. However, we could avoid getting involved in the internal problems of a neighboring country, secure our borders, and prioritize national interest over ideology.
In December last, after thirteen years of internal fighting, loss of life, and devastation, the five-decade-long Assad regime was swept away in barely two weeks.
Looking back, one may say that the US-Israel-led Western project to remake the Middle East started with Iraq and continued with the Arab Spring regime change projects in Libya and Syria. After a long stalemate in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group linked to al-Qaida, became a proxy that could challenge the Assad regime. The lightning speed of the HTS offensive was a huge surprise. Still, those aware of the group’s growing military capability could have predicted that it was coming particularly because the offensive was launched at a time when Hezbollah, Iran’s principal partner in the “Axis of Resistance” was dealt a serious blow in Gaza and Lebanon putting Tehran on the retreat as Russia remained focused on the war in Ukraine.
After the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli forces have moved to control a 400 sq. km. demilitarized buffer zone in Syrian territory. Israel’s Defense Minister Katz has reaffirmed the country’s intention to occupy a swath of Syrian territory beyond Israel’s contested northern borders for an “unlimited amount of time”.[i]
Following President Assad’s ouster from power, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of the Islamist militant group HTS became Syria’s interim president as Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa. To strike a balance between his past and present, he is now wearing suits but keeping his beard.
Ankara has warmly welcomed the HTS takeover of power in Syria. Foreign Minister Fidan has visited Damascus and President Al-Sharaa has been in Ankara.
During the past ten days, two developments in Syria made headlines in the international media.
Firstly, the death toll from the clashes between Syrian security forces and loyalists of President al-Assad, and the revenge killings that followed, rose to more than a thousand. Lack of information led to different views as to who started the fighting, but many reports said that in many Alawite villages and towns, gunmen opened fire at Alawites on the streets or at the gates of their homes and that many Alawite homes were looted and then set on fire in different areas.
Mr. al-Sharaa vowed to “hold accountable, firmly and without leniency, anyone who was involved in the bloodshed of civilians… or who overstepped the powers of the state”. Hopefully, that settling of accounts would also include the sending away of foreign jihadists in Syria since their priority cannot possibly be Syria’s stability.
Secondly, an agreement was signed between President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Mr. Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Kurdish-led and U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[ii] Although called “agreement”, the short text signed in Damascus lacks detail, any specifics regarding its implementation, and as such is a “declaration of intent”. Notably, it allows the SDF to share the mantle of the Syrian state without much change on the ground. For example, the agreement covers, “Integrating all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields.” Does that mean the “central government’s” officials, police, and military personnel would take control of these offices from the SDF? No. There might be some coordination between the two sides regarding their functioning, but the SDF will retain regional authority.
What is most important for the SDF is the article that says, “Recognizing the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian state, with the Syrian state guaranteeing their right to citizenship and all constitutional rights.” This would determine the extent of its cooperation with Damascus.
Considering the immediate challenges facing the people of Syria, the agreement is a step forward whatever the intentions of the signatories and the behind-the-scenes dealmakers might be. References to guaranteeing the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process and all state institutions; establishing a ceasefire across all Syrian territories; and, rejecting calls for division, hate speech, and attempts to sow discord among all components of Syrian society, if respected, can contribute to the rebuilding of Syria. The key question would be the division of authority between the central government and regions, above all the SDF-controlled northeastern Syria.
The agreement is imposed on the parties by Washington, no doubt, with Israel’s endorsement. In recent days, mention was made of “Israeli anger” at direct talks between Hamas and US officials. Looking at the relationship between Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu, this is hardly convincing. Perhaps it is designed to give the impression that the world’s two closest allies do not see eye to eye on all Middle East problems, including the developments in Syria. In truth, they do, perhaps not always one hundred percent but surely ninety-five percent, which is more than exceptional.
Since the primary challenge in Syria is ensuring domestic stability, hopefully, the Damascus “declaration of intent” would help accomplish that. In the middle and long term, however, Syria’s re-emerging as an Arab power would be out of the question. Syria will not be allowed to rearm. Moreover, Israel would never bury for good its aim of a fragmented Syria. In other words, the US, Israel, and Türkiye all have cooperated in the ouster of the Assad regime but that is the end of it, at least between the latter two, given Ankara’s extreme anti-Israel rhetoric over Gaza. What puts the two in the same basket is having troops in Syria.[iii]
The agreement between Damascus and the SDF came at an interesting time for Türkiye. Because, for months now, the AKP government and its principal ally, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), have been engaged in what they call a “process” to have the PKK lay down its arms and dissolve itself. The process is not exactly transparent, and not much is known, if anything, about a likely US role.
Had Türkiye remained on the democratic path such a process would not have been on our agenda. The Kurds of Türkiye, looking at the neighboring countries, would have considered themselves lucky to be citizens of the democratic, secular Turkish Republic. Türkiye’s problem is not ethnicity, it is our declining democracy.
Days before assuming office, President-elect Mr. Trump praised President Erdogan and called him a “friend.” “President Erdogan is a friend of mine. He’s a guy I like, respect. I think he respects me also,” Trump said during a press conference at his Mar-a-Lago. However, since January 20, there has been no contact between the two presidents.
If and when a call comes, the top item would be Syria and perhaps suggestions for better relations between Türkiye and Israel.
[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/12/israel-to-occupy-syrian-southern-territory-for-unlimited-time-says-minister
[ii] https://sana.sy/en/?p=349228
[iii] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2024/07/08/turkiyes-overlooked-gift-to-israel/