Gaza Ceasefire Talks Should No Longer Be a Distraction
Since the Hamas onslaught of October 7, world attention has essentially focused on two aspects of the war in Gaza. First, the ferocity of the IDF operations that have caused immense loss of civilian life and devastation, and second, the ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange talks.
In late June, in his first Israeli media interview since the start of the war in October, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that the “intense phase” of fighting Hamas in Gaza is “nearly” over, allowing forces to move to the northern border with Lebanon to confront its ally Hezbollah. He also said that Israel was prepared to pause fighting in Gaza for a partial deal in exchange for the return of some hostages held by Hamas. Still, he stressed, “That doesn’t mean the war is about to end”, with action continuing until Hamas was completely driven from power. Addressing the escalating hostilities with Hezbollah, which raised fears of a wider regional war, he said: ″We can fight on several fronts, and we are prepared to do that.”
My impression at the time was that Mr. Netanyahu was thinking of continuing the war in Gaza in different ways depending on the battlefield requirements, lowering the loss of life among Gazans, keeping the talks over hostage-prisoner exchange and humanitarian aid alive, and thus gaining time until the upcoming US presidential election that might pave the way for another family visit to a Trump White House. With President Biden remaining in the race, this was a certainty. With Kamala Harris, not anymore. Regardless, Mr. Netanyahu knows that no matter who is in the White House, he can manage Washington’s Middle East policy more than Washington can steer his conduct of the war in Gaza.
The current loss of civilian life and the devastation in Gaza are somewhat lower than the first few months of the war but they are still blatant violations of international law and rules of good conduct. Gazans are constantly told to evacuate certain areas, go to the so-called “safe zones”, and then ordered to move again and again elsewhere. Nowhere is safe. In the meantime, the Gaza Strip is becoming inhabitable land. This is the reality of the battleground.
As for the second and “diplomatic” aspect of the war, the endless ceasefire/hostage-prisoner exchange talks have yielded nothing, so far. Senior US officials have traveled to Israel, Egypt, and Qatar numerous times. Israeli delegations have met them and indirectly with the Hamas representatives. Those meetings made news but that was all.
On May 31, President Biden announced that Israel has offered a comprehensive new proposal. He described the three-phase Israeli plan as a roadmap to an enduring ceasefire and the release of all hostages. The next day, Prime Minister Netanyahu, while not openly rejecting or endorsing the plan stated that Israel’s conditions for ending the war had not changed: the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, the freeing of all hostages, and ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel. “The notion that Israel will agree to a permanent ceasefire before these conditions are fulfilled is a non-starter,” he added.
This led to some confusion but it was generally agreed that the plan had been negotiated between the US and the Israeli war cabinet. Hamas’s initial reaction was that it had a positive view of the contents of a three-phase ceasefire.
On June 10, the UN Security Council, through Resolution 2735 (2024), endorsed the plan announced by President Biden. By the same Resolution it rejected any attempt at demographic or territorial change in the Gaza Strip, including any actions that reduce the territory of Gaza; reiterated its unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution; and stressed the importance of unifying the Gaza Strip with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.
Then came Secretary Blinken’s eighth trip to the region since the Hamas attack of October 7. Throughout his visit, he repeatedly said that the ceasefire deal depended solely on Hamas’s agreement.
In response to a question referring to the statement mentioned above by Prime Minister Netanyahu, Mr. Blinken said, “First, let me be very clear: Israel has accepted the proposal. In fact, they were critical in putting it forward. So, the only party that has not accepted, the only party that’s not said yes is Hamas. That’s who everyone is waiting on.” Thus, he was blaming Hamas entirely for any failure of the talks.
Finally, in his August 8, 2024, interview with Time magazine, Mr. Netanyahu was asked if he still insists that Israel should be able to resume fighting after a ceasefire hostage deal, as this is crippling the chances of the deal. He said, “I’ll say this, that I believe the way that I’m seeking to to, to ah, achieve this deal is a way that will maximize the number of hostages that are released in the first phase, living hostages that are released in the first phase, but also that would make sure that Hamas cannot take over Gaza after the deal. That is something that would run against everything that we were talking about. It also would not secure the release of all the hostages. And I’m committed to doing that.”[i]
Considering the diametrically opposite positions of the two sides, particularly Mr. Netanyahu’s reaffirming more than once that such a deal will not mark the end of the fighting, one cannot but conclude that the nine-month “diplomatic flurry” about a hostage-prisoner exchange deal was a distraction by the Netanyahu government like the US built Gaza floating pier, to keep the hostage families and their supporters at bay and blunt the international criticism directed against the IDF operations and the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Now, however, a ceasefire is imperative, more than ever before.
The New York Times reported last week that Israel has achieved all that it can militarily in Gaza, according to senior American officials, who say continued bombings are only increasing risks to civilians. At the same time, the possibility of further weakening Hamas has diminished.[ii]
Hamas did not participate in the indirect talks on a Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal last week in Doha. It called a possible deal, “an illusion”. Even if such a deal is reached this week, it will be followed by mutual accusations of violations and more fighting. Because for Mr. Netanyahu the job is not finished yet, and Hamas will not agree, with or without a deal, to turn into a non-existence. Nonetheless, this would be the first small step of a long and painful process to bring some semblance of peace to Gaza. A ceasefire and hostage-prisoner exchange will also give President Biden the last opportunity to claim a diplomatic achievement. Otherwise, with the approaching of winter and lack of housing, sanitation, and healthcare, Gaza will become an even worse humanitarian catastrophe. Settlement activity and violence in the West Bank will continue. Needless to add, the “two-state solution” remains a chimera.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei’s promise to avenge the July 31 killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has added a further dimension to the hostage-prisoner exchange talks. Some believe that a Gaza ceasefire might convince Tehran not to react. Indeed, a deal may delay Iran’s response but not forever. At some point, Tehran will respond but in a limited way, without provoking a direct US intervention, contrary to Mr. Netanyahu’s expectations who wishes to eliminate Iran, like Iraq and Syria, from the Middle East balance of power.
Last Thursday, the 88-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of Palestine addressed the Turkish Parliament for the second time under totally different circumstances from his November 2007 visit, when both President Shimon Peres and Mr. Abbas delivered remarks before the Parliament. Perhaps, he should look at the Biden example, learn the lesson, and leave the stage to a younger Palestinian leader capable of making tough decisions.
A final word on the seemingly approaching high-level meetings between Türkiye and Syria to “normalize relations”, in other words, to start repairing the damage caused by AKP’s biggest foreign and security blunder in Türkiye’s Republican history. Last week, the AKP government’s Defense Minister reportedly listed the conditions for the “normalization” of relations between the two countries and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria. Topping the list was the adoption by Damascus of a new constitution embracing all Syrians. The easiest way to meet that condition would be proposing to Damascus to adopt Türkiye’s AKP constitution with its unique presidential system in letter and spirit and thus turn Syria immediately into an advanced democratic country like Türkiye. President Assad would be delighted.
[i] https://time.com/7008852/benjamin-netanyahu-interview-transcript/
[ii] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/14/us/politics/israel-military-gaza-war.html?campaign_id=51&emc=edit_mbe_20240815&instance_id=131752&nl=morning-briefing%3A-europe-edition®i_id=60